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Abstract
The paper considers the issue of whether a supranational fiscal policy in Europe
is needed, and, if so what responsibilities it should undertake.  The literature on
endogenous growth and the principle of subsidiarity suggest that such a policy should be
limited to externalities or economies of scale not captured at the national level.  These may
include spending on research and development and transportation or knowledge networks,
and harmonization of social security designed to enhance labor mobility.  EU-wide
stabilization policy or enhanced EU redistribution does not seem justified, however.
Editorial
On May 11-12, 2000 the National Bank of Belgium hosted a Conference on "How to
promote economic growth in the euro area?".  A number of papers presented at the
conference is made available to a broader audience in the Working Papers series of
the Bank.  This volume contains the third of these papers.  The other five papers
were issued as Working Papers 5-6 and 8-10.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 3
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1. INTRODUCTION
Much has already been written about the possible evolution of fiscal policy in
Europe in the light of the formation of a monetary union.  The creation of the euro in
January 1, 1999, the subsequent implementation of a common monetary policy by the
ECB, and the coming into force of the Stability and Growth Pact for the countries in
euroland have created a new immediacy for the issue.  In this paper, the design of fiscal
policy will be discussed from the perspective of long-term growth of the euro area.  The
focus is on whether an expanded European fiscal policy is desirable, or even perhaps
essential, from that perspective.  The design of fiscal institutions can have potentially large
effects, for good or ill, on economic performance.  Less attention will be given to the
desirable orientation of national or subnational fiscal policies.  The growth perspective is
dictated by the focus of the conference, rather than by a conviction that maximizing growth
is the same thing as maximizing welfare.
There would seem to be three central questions that need to be answered when
forming a judgement about the design of European
1 fiscal policy.  First, is greater
coordination of fiscal policies needed in the context of a monetary union?  To some extent,
EU countries have already answered yes to this question, and the provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty on excessive deficits and the Stability and Growth Pact are the result.
However, the issue remains whether the system will work adequately without further
changes.  Second, if greater coordination in some form is needed, can it be achieved
through greater harmonization and  inter-governmental coordination or will it require some
form of fiscal federalism, as implemented by nation states such as the United States,
Germany, or Canada, among others?  And third, aside from the above institutional
questions, are there good economic reasons why greater power at the European
supranational level would be good for economic growth, and, if so, in what areas would
European fiscal policy have a comparative advantage?  These reasons might include
externalities that can be best exploited at the European level, such as those related to
knowledge networks, subsidies to innovation, etc.
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It is obvious that to reach a view about the desirability of one or another design of
European fiscal institutions requires examining a broad set of factors that extend well
beyond narrow positive economic analysis.  Concern about loss of economic sovereignty
may dominate considerations of economic efficiency.  Alternatively, the desire to enhance
individuals’ economic freedom may result in a distrust of bureaucracies and resistance to
any extension of the power of governments
2  And the extent that a strong sense of
European solidarity emerges may dictate whether European redistribution through fiscal
policies develops.  So this paper will not attempt to reach a definitive view or pretend to
treat all the important questions.  Instead, it will consider whether economic analysis,
especially the new literature on endogenous growth, has interesting things to say about the
desirable evolution of European fiscal policy. Obviously also relevant are the literatures on
fiscal federalism (e.g. Oates, 1972; Walsh, 1993) and economic policy coordination (e.g.
Bryant, 1995), though neither is based on models of endogenous growth.
It is argued below that given the size of national government spending in Europe,
there is no scope for additional fiscal policy involvement of European institutions.
Moreover, a clear implication of the principle of subsidiarity is that European fiscal policy
should be limited to correcting distortions or exploiting externalities that cannot be
corrected or exploited by national fiscal policies.  One such externality is tax competition,
but this may best be addressed by government agreements to harmonize tax rates or
coordinate their collection. When considering government investment spending, the EU
budget should be limited to those items where the EU-wide (social) rate of return exceeds
the national returns.  Where externalities do not extend across national boundaries, or can
be appropriated by countries raising taxes or imposing user fees, then they should not be
the responsibility of EU institutions.
The paper first sets the stage for considering an EU-wide fiscal policy by putting
the role of government in EU countries into perspective relative to other industrial
countries.  It then briefly reviews endogenous growth theory before examining the case for
fiscal policy coordination and how to achieve it.  The specific areas where a European
fiscal policy might be desirable are discussed, focussing on the allocative, stabilization,
and redistributive roles of fiscal policy.  This is followed by a concluding section.
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2. THE CONTEXT FOR FISCAL POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Any consideration of EU fiscal policies must acknowledge that the starting point is
one in which European countries stand out as having an extraordinarily high level of
government services and taxation, relative to other industrial countries and even more so,
relative to poorer countries.  Some macroeconomic data are presented in Table 1; aside
from Ireland and the United Kingdom, virtually all of the EU countries have substantially
higher levels of government spending and taxation than the non-European industrial
countries.  The higher involvement of EU governments concerns mainly a larger amount of
spending on redistribution, especially social security systems.
High levels of spending in Europe emerged in the early postwar period as an
element of social consensus between employers and unions.  Indeed, generous
unemployment insurance and health schemes have been administered jointly by the
“social partners” in several EU countries.  While this high level of redistribution has no
doubt had a favorable impact on social cohesion and has smoothed labor relations, the
associated rigidity has increasingly been seen to have costs.  High social contributions by
employers and generous unemployment benefits have discouraged employment, and the
rise in unemployment further increased the extent of redistribution, creating a vicious
circle.  Health care costs have risen rapidly as public insurance has permitted excessive
use of some services.  As a result of the ageing of the population, generous pay-as-you-go
pension plans increasingly have had to face the choice of raising contributions or reducing
benefits, especially since public plans in several countries permitted early retirement in
sectors (coal, steel, shipbuilding) hit by high unemployment as the result of loss of
competitiveness or adverse demand shifts.
The evident budgetary and efficiency costs of some social programs have led to
an attempt to roll back the role (and cost) of government, but the process has proved
difficult and contentious, and countries have been successful to varying extents.  The
United Kingdom and Denmark, for instance, have substantially reduced publicly provided
pension benefits in favor of private, funded retirement plans, and the Netherlands has
moved away from centralized labor negotiations and substantially reduced disability
benefits.  Other countries (such as Belgium, France, and Spain) have liberalized part-time
work in order to increase flexibility, as well as reducing social charges for the lower paid,
where the employment disincentives were greatest.  Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows,
there remains a large gap between the typical EU country and the other industrial4 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
countries in terms of the size of government spending.  While empirical evidence is not
uncontroversial, it seems hard to deny that the disappointing output and employment
growth in some European countries during the last few decades is due in part to the
rigidities resulting from a large public sector and generous social programs.  Evidence
summarized in Crafts (2000) suggests that OECD countries, especially those in Europe,
have passed the point where the favorable effects of government spending on growth are
offset by the disincentive effects of taxes.  Therefore, the design of a European fiscal
policy must be considered in a context where a further decline in the role of government
would in many cases be desirable, rather than any expansion.  This makes the case for an
EU-wide fiscal policy doubly hard to make, since it needs to be accompanied by suggested
areas for reduction in national responsibilities.
Turning to the current size of the EU budget, Table 2 shows that spending
commitments, at 97 billion euros in 1999, are very modest as a proportion of EU GDP—
only some 1.25 percent.  Aside from agricultural expenditures, which make up about half of
the budget, spending is mainly on transfers to poorer regions (structural operations), and
to a much more limited extent on administrative expenditures, external action, and
research subsidies.  Revenues are accounted for primarily by GNP-based contributions
from member states and the EU’s share of VAT revenues.  Customs duties are relatively
small, given the trend decline in tariff rates.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 5
3. LESSONS FROM ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY
The endogenous growth literature suggests many avenues for government
intervention to affect growth (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998; also the survey of fiscal policy
and growth in a broader context by Tanzi and Zee, 1997).  The neoclassical theories of
economic growth (e.g. Solow, 1956) took technical progress to be exogenous, and long-
run growth was determined by it and population growth.  Economic policy, such as policies
to stimulate saving or to tax the returns to investment, could affect the level of per capita
income but not its growth rate.  Newer models with the rate of technical progress
endogenous in principle imply much more powerful effects of fiscal policy, because they
can permanently increase the growth rate of output
3
At a very general level, tax or subsidy policies that encourage investment can
raise the growth rate in endogenous growth models, provided the social rate of return on
investment exceeds the private return (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  A higher social
return may be the result of externalities; for instance, the accumulation of knowledge may
benefit not just the individual but also the society as a whole.  Innovations may produce the
base for further innovation, with the original innovator unable to appropriate all the profits.
Or “learning by doing” may increase the skill level of the whole economy (and not just the
firm undertaking production).  In these circumstances, social returns may exceed private
returns.
While this paper cannot attempt to survey the endogenous growth literature
4, a
brief review of the main strands is in order, since they have somewhat different
implications.  The first main strand is what is known as AK models
5, in which each
individual firm j faces a traditional Cobb-Douglas production function with exogenous
technology factor 
a 1
j
a
j j L BK Y : B
- = .  However, the level of knowledge in the economy as a
whole depends on the aggregate capital stock; it is assumed that the technology
parameter increases with the economy-wide capital labor ratio,  b ) L / K ( A B = , where
￿ = j K K and  ￿ = j L L .  If the further assumption is made that a+b=1, then the aggregate
production function becomes Y=AK.  In this model, the firm does not internalize the effect
                                                          
3 However, Harris (1996) points out that for most relevant planning horizons, level effects and growth rate effects are
indistinguishable, and that the former could be comparable to the latter in magnitude.
4 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) and a paper by Stephen Turnovsky prepared for this conference.
5 Developed by Frankel (1962) and popularized by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).6 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
that its investment has in increasing economy-wide knowledge, so investment is too low.
There is therefore a role for fiscal policy to subsidize investment and thereby increase
growth and welfare.  Unlike in neoclassical growth models, in which capital accumulation
can proceed too far and generate “dynamic inefficiency,” more capital accumulation can
never reduce per capita consumption in this model (though there is a limit to which a social
planner would like to sacrifice current consumption in order to invest and produce more
future consumption).  The AK model thus has a clear policy implication for government
policy, but the model does not contain the richness of detail that would allow it to make
predictions concerning the type of investment or the sectors that should be favored.
A second strand of endogenous growth models is much richer in that it
distinguishes between capital accumulation and innovation, that is the creation of new
goods or goods of improved quality.  In these models, technological progress corresponds
to an increase in the number of different types of capital goods (the “variety model”), or the
creation of new capital goods of higher quality (the “quality ladder model”)
6 The latter
models have been termed “Schumpeterian,” because they build on the insight from Joseph
Schumpeter that innovation involves “creative destruction.”  Thus, a new innovation makes
obsolete earlier products or techniques.
An example of such a model is given in Aghion and Howitt (1998, chapter 2).  It
abstracts from capital accumulation; instead, output of the consumption good depends on
the input of an intermediate good x  as follows:
a Ax y =
Labor can serve to produce either innovations (i.e. be devoted to research, in amount n) or
the intermediate goods x that go into the production of consumer goods; one unit of labor
is required to produce each x.  The economy’s total stock of labor is equal to L, so
n x L + =
Labor devoted to research produces innovations but with a lapse of time that is stochastic,
based on a Poisson process, where the mean arrival rate is ln.  An innovation increases
the technology parameter by the constant factor g, so
t 1 t A A g = +
where here t refers to the time innovations occur, not fixed intervals.  Innovators can
monopolize the intermediate goods sector until replaced by the next innovator, but there
are positive spillovers that are reflected in growth in A: the monopoly rents earned by the
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innovator are less than the consumer surplus created by the intermediate good, and the
invention makes it possible for other researchers to work on the next innovation.  An
arbitrage condition determines the amount of labor devoted to the two uses, research and
production, so that expected profits from the two are equalized.
In this model, the benefits of increased knowledge do not accrue entirely to the
firm or individual realizing the innovation.  Lack of complete appropriability combined with
an intertemporal externality resulting from the fact that current innovations allow future
innovations to build on them (with monopoly profits accruing to other innovators) suggests
that privately determined R&D investment will be too low.  However, this neglects the fact
that an innovation produces a loss to society that is not internalized by the research firm,
because it makes products by other firms obsolete.  This is termed the “business-stealing
effect” by Aghion and Howitt (1998).  Thus the net effect on R&D investment relative to its
optimal level is ambiguous. It may not be the case that investment is too low from a
welfare standpoint.
Though innovations can be embodied in new capital equipment, they need not be,
as the above model shows.  In more complicated models, technological progress can have
several possible sources. Primary innovation can result from R&D investment, while
secondary innovation can involve embodying primary innovations in specific capital goods.
Another channel for endogenous growth is the accumulation of human capital, which
enhances the productivity of labor.  Human capital can increase because of formal
education or from “learning by doing.”
Because of the richness of endogenous growth models, it is difficult to summarize
any general conclusions from them for fiscal policy, aside from the desirability of
stimulating productive activities or investment in areas where the social return is greater
than the private return.  At a minimum, it suggests that subsidies to research, if they are
targeted, should be directed to areas where the externalities of increased knowledge are
greatest, and where the ability of private firms to appropriate the benefits is small (for
instance, in pure rather than applied research, and in fields where patent protection may
be less effective).  The success of targeting, however, depends on how much information
officials have.  A better alternative may be to “let the market decide” and provide
untargeted subsidies to whatever firms take them up, or to set up private sector boards for8 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
allocating funds
7  But the way technological change impacts the economy is crucial.
Knowledge may not result just from research but also from “learning by doing”.  If “learning
by doing” produces benefits that are largely external to firms (increasing the general level
of skills for the economy as a whole), then this type of knowledge accumulation could be
too low relative to pure research.  So blanket subsidies to pure research (shifting
resources out of the productive sector) may not be good for growth.  Multi-product models
where goods are produced with different technologies and by workers with different skill
levels suggest that growth may also be increased, in an environment of continual
innovation, by increased mobility or adaptability of the work force (Lucas, 1993; Aghion
and Howitt, 1998, chapter 6).  Such models suggest that fiscal policy needs to focus on
education and flexibility-enhancing training.
Unlike the neoclassical growth models, in which growth is divorced from cyclical
fluctuations, the new endogenous growth models integrate, to a greater or lesser extent,
the two phenomena.  In particular, Schumpeterian models can explain economic
downturns as the result of the technological innovations that produce long-term growth.
Though the above model based on Aghion and Howitt (1998), chapter 2, does not produce
recessions, a slightly more complicated model with two stages of innovations is capable of
doing so (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1994).  Suppose that the first stage is devoted to
discovering a general-purpose technology (GPT), but that this does not increase output
until it is embodied in an intermediate good, which requires a second stage of innovation.
Since research involves the use of productive resources  (labor), during the time between
the arrival of a new GPT and the discovery of a way of embodying it into an intermediate
good, aggregate output goes down.  More complicated dynamics are possible in models
where the stages of innovation exceed two and where there are knowledge spillovers in
adapting to the new technology.
The general implication of such models is that creative destruction accompanying
innovation, by making existing technologies obsolete and requiring a sectoral reallocation
of other factors (primarily labor), may in the short run produce recessions even though in
the longer run it contributes to higher output.  Indeed, following Schumpeter a case can be
made that recessions are in fact good for growth, because they allow weeding out of less
productive firms, or force reorganizations to make firms more efficient, allowing them to
survive.  A somewhat different reason for not being concerned with recessions is that
output may be mismeasured in the presence of innovation, because the national accounts
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do not capture the future productivity involved in increases in knowledge (unlike those in
capital equipment, which show up in investment).  The links between cyclical fluctuations
and growth are explored more fully below, when considering implications for stabilization
policy.
Endogenous growth models also permit a more satisfactory consideration of fiscal
redistribution policy than is possible in neoclassical models, where it is assumed that there
is a basic tradeoff is between greater equity and the lower efficiency associated with
redistribution.  In endogenous growth models, redistribution need not be harmful to growth,
nor greater inequality be the result of the growth process, as was argued (for an
intermediate range of income levels) by Kuznets.  Political economy reasons may produce
higher growth if redistribution, by reducing inequality, weakens entrenched interests and
eliminates social conflicts (Benabou, 1996), while if the poor are credit constrained,
redistribution may improve their productivity (Aghion et al., 1999).
If the scope for productive fiscal policies to stimulate long-run growth is enhanced
by endogenous growth models, the potentially negative effects of distorting taxes are also
greater.  Rather than simply affecting the level of output, taxes may have permanent
growth rate effects by discouraging accumulation of the relevant factor or discouraging
innovation. Thus, the case for specific government policies needs to be balanced carefully
against the potential growth rate reductions due to the taxes that are raised to finance the
expenditures.  Moreover, the nature of the public goods produced by governments should
influence optimal tax policy.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) argue that many public goods
are subject to congestion, and hence are rival but to some extent non-excludable.  In these
circumstances, they should be financed by income taxation, which operates like a user fee,
rather than by lump-sum taxation.
Empirical studies of the effect of different tax structures on long-term growth are
few, given the difficulties in getting detailed cross-country data on tax rates.  One of the
few studies, Mendoza et al. (1997), finds some confirmation of Harberger’s conjecture that
tax policy has little effect on long-run growth.  Though the mix of direct and indirect taxes is
in theory an important determinant, in practice plausible changes in tax rates are unlikely
to affect growth to an economically significant extent, even if they have a reasonably large
effect on investment.10 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
4. COMPETITION VERSUS COORDINATION
The case for coordination of fiscal policies within the European Union is based on
two principal arguments.  First, with greater integration among EU countries (including
especially greater factor mobility), tax competition may lead to a reduction in tax rates, thus
limiting the scope for financing  (except by benefit taxation) otherwise desirable fiscal
spending at the national level.  Coordination of tax policies (in particular, harmonization on
a high enough rate that government tax revenues are not adversely affected) would be a
possible response.  Alternatively, if there are efficiency gains from a common tax
administration, there would be a case for levying EU-wide taxes, and either moving some
spending to the EU-wide level, or instituting a system of transfers of revenue from the EU
to national governments.
The second argument for coordination of fiscal policies lies with externalities that
cause uncoordinated policies to be suboptimal. In general terms, this may occur if the
benefits of public goods extend across national borders, if there are increasing returns to
scale in the provision of public goods, or if there are macroeconomic spillovers from fiscal
policies.  Possible externalities and efficiency gains from public goods are discussed
below, so here we focus on macroeconomic spillovers.
The excessive deficit procedure of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact are based on a concern that independently chosen fiscal policies would be
too expansionary (because, for instance, of electoral cycles leading policymakers to have
short horizons and high discount rates), and would thereby endanger the price stability
objective of the common monetary policy. This fear may also add to uncertainty, which
may lower investment and harm growth.  Hence some way of tying the hands of
governments and threatening sanctions if they exceed a deficit threshold is judged to be
desirable. The periodic occurrence of government solvency crises suggests that this fear
has some objective reality.  Though there has been considerable debate about the extent
to which the market would be able to discipline national fiscal policies, and about whether
the no-bailout clause of the ECB is sufficient in itself to prevent negative spillovers of errant
national policies, in any case a decision has been taken to proceed with constraints on
national fiscal policies.
But there are other reasons why uncoordinated fiscal policies (even if constrained
not to exceed limits on deficits) may be suboptimal.  Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) argue thatNBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 11
since countries in monetary union share the same real exchange rate with the rest of the
world, they will each be led to overexpansionary policies in response to asymmetric
shocks, but insufficiently expansionary policies in response to a symmetric, but transitory,
supply shock.  In contrast, coordinated policies would be designed to optimally incorporate
the shared effect of the monetary area’s trade balance on the real exchange rate.
The experience of existing federal systems helps to shed some light on the
importance both of tax competition and lack of coordination of government spending
policies.   Subnational governments in both the United States and Canada exhibit
continuing substantial differences in tax rates on personal income and goods and services,
perhaps because relative prices adjust, including the price of land (Tiebout, 1956).  It could
be argued that the remaining pressure toward low taxes resulting from competition is a
salutary force, helping to keep governments honest by providing some choices to citizens
(Buchanan in Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999, chapter 3).  However, in specific areas the
absence of either coordination among U.S.  states or federal programs has prevented the
creation of arguably welfare-improving policies, for instance universal health care in the
United States.  Tanzi (2000) has argued that increasing globalization will lead to a
widespread cutback and redesign of social protection.  There is a legitimate concern that
increasing mobility will lead to limits on social security programs in Europe, though some
would argue that this is a good thing.  In the absence of a consensus across Europe about
the desirable features of social security, it may be difficult to achieve enough
harmonization to prevent competition toward the bottom from operating.  This would
jeopardize the ability of those countries wanting to operate more generous programs than
the average, and might even lead to a spiral downward to levels that no country would
consider first-best.
Turning to spending policies, though U.S. states have little scope for discretionary
fiscal policies, in Canada the provinces have greater fiscal powers and have at times had
substantial budgetary imbalances.  In particular, during the 1980s, provinces faced
different cyclical positions, and Ontario’s expansionary policies no doubt contributed to an
appreciated real exchange rate that added to the recessionary forces affecting other
regions (Courchene, 1993).  Thus there does seem to be some reason to expect that lack
of coordination could cause problems within Europe, especially as a result of the larger
countries’ fiscal policies.12 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
5. DOES COORDINATION REQUIRE A FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY ?
If one takes as given that greater coordination of fiscal policies may be desirable
in Europe, what form should it take?  There would seem to be three general models of how
to achieve it.  First, countries could agree to harmonize their tax and expenditure policies.
For instance, in the area of social security there could be an agreement on common tax
rates and benefit levels (leaving aside for the moment different tax capacities in different
countries).  Enforcing such agreements might be difficult without some European-wide
institutional involvement: in federations, this is usually achieved through shared-cost
programs, in which the junior governments have a financial incentive to go along with the
federal government standards. Already, there is a considerable degree of harmonization of
VAT rates and administration.  Attempts at harmonization of taxes on investment income
have been a notable failure, and there has been little coordination, much less
harmonization, of social policies.
Second, the governments could agree to a common program administered by the
relevant European institutions.   If an important program were involved, e.g. social security,
then going down this road would involve moving a considerable way toward a system of
fiscal federalism, with all the emotive responses that such a prospect stimulates.  The
enforcement mechanism mentioned above (shared cost programs) would however already
be a step in that direction.
Third, coordination could involve intergovernmental surveillance over national
fiscal policies, but no binding constraints on the exercise of national sovereignty (aside
from possible sanctions from running excessive deficits) nor significant development of an
EU budget.  In this model, coordination would result from peer pressure, but, as in global
policymaking (e.g. G-7 policy coordination), there would be nothing to ensure that
governments would act any differently than they would if they set policies in an
uncoordinated way.  Moreover, the G-7 experience has involved only episodic
coordination, at best.   The only possible difference might be that the closeness of EU
government relationships in a number of areas could reinforce the effectiveness of peer
pressure.
Which model eventually prevails will be determined in the political arena, and
economic considerations will be only one, and perhaps not the most important,
consideration.  Nevertheless, there are some observations that can be made about theNBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 13
various institutional alternatives.  First, though a clear enunciation of the institutional setup
at an early stage would be desirable (as suggested by James Buchanan in Buchanan and
Musgrave, 1999, p. 202), this is unlikely to happen.  Instead, institutions will evolve over
time, as a result of struggles between competing bureaucracies or initiatives by political
leaders, with public opinion also influencing the process.  At any point in time, the system
will reflect all three models: in some areas there will be harmonization, in others
surveillance and peer pressure, and in still others, some elements of fiscal federalism.
Even nations with constitutions and laws setting up the responsibilities of various
institutions see long periods before a degree of stability and a clear vision of respective
roles are defined.  The experience of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, reviewed by
Eichengreen (1992), is a case in point.  Furthermore, the context for the operation of fiscal
policy in the euro area will evolve, perhaps drastically, with the admission of new members
and possibly as a result of structural changes caused by greater economic integration.  For
instance, the common use of the euro will facilitate transactions, lead to consolidation of
financial systems, and perhaps help produce greater labor mobility.  The rationale for a
common fiscal policy may be considerably stronger in ten or twenty years as a result.
Second, there is likely to be a tradeoff between the flexibility of the arrangements
chosen and the ability to eliminate beggar-thy-neighbor behavior.  Fully optimal policies
(absent problems of time consistency, à la Barro-Gordon), would allow the fiscal policy to
be tailored to each shock, and reflect aggregate welfare; by the definition in the theoretical
literature, this is the coordinated solution.  The optimal policy is unlikely to be described by
a simple, easily monitored, policy rule, hence, in practice, there is no guarantee that in any
given circumstance coordination can be achieved, and the optimal policies chosen.
Alternatives to such flexible coordination include harmonization or common EU-wide
programs.  Neither is likely to be fully optimal, because based on a “one-size fits all”
approach.  However, such arrangements may be more likely to guarantee that some form
of coordination will occur that rules out the worst outcomes.
Finally, one can question whether monetary integration can survive without tighter
political integration.  As pointed out, for instance, by Goodhart (1996), EMU as currently
constituted is a unique enterprise—the creation of a currency without a sovereign behind it,
in the sense of a government exercising all the traditional powers of nation-states.  This
situation might make the monetary union fragile.  For instance, if circumstances facing one
of the members of monetary union go seriously awry, can the union persist without some
financial assistance by the others?  If not, will some sort of national safety net be14 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
institutionalized to provide the assistance?  Similarly, will pressures for portability of social
benefits and integration of tax systems become overwhelming once the freedom to move
within the EU (as guaranteed by the Single Market program) is fully exploited?  While the
answers to these questions are not unambiguous, they nevertheless point in the direction
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6. IN WHAT AREAS SHOULD A EUROPEAN FISCAL POLICY OPERATE ?
It is useful when considering this question to discuss in turn the traditional
functions of fiscal policy, grouped into its allocative, stabilization, and redistributive roles.
Starting from the principle of subsidiarity, the case for EU-wide fiscal policies must rely on
the existence of externalities or distortions which cannot be captured or corrected at the
national level.
6.1 Allocation
The main categories of spending where social returns may exceed private returns
would seem to consist in spending on education, public infrastructure, and R&D.  Such
spending can have externalities that are not captured in private decisionmaking so that
there is a potential role for government spending in these areas to help increase long-run
growth
8.   To what extent should this be done at the supra-national, rather than national,
level?  The criterion for these activities should be that the (social) return to the EU is
greater than the national return.  Otherwise, national governments would already have the
proper incentives to optimally subsidize activities where the return to the country exceeded
private returns.
The activity of education would not seem to involve significant externalities that go
beyond national borders
9.  Indeed, education is often the responsibility of regional or local
governments within countries, whether they be unitary states or federations.  The case for
a common national (or supranational) policy is usually based on redistributive arguments:
residents of those regions that are too poor to meet a common standard should not suffer
the loss of opportunities that inferior education would imply.  With the European Union
consisting of countries with roughly similar per capita incomes, or at least prosperous
enough to offer adequate education, the case for commonly financed education is not
compelling.
                                                          
8  The growth literature does not give very specific guidance, however.  Aschauer (1989) found large returns from
government infrastructure investment, which have been questioned by other economists.  Barro (1991) reported
regessions in which growth was negatively related to government consumption expenditures, but not to public
investment, which had little relationship with growth.  De Long and Summers (1991) found that the social rate of return to
equipment investment was 30 percent per year or higher, and argued that government policy should be designed to
stimulate it.  Mansfield (1996) surveys studies that found that R&D in several industries had social returns far in excess
of their private returns.
9  Education per se needs to be distinguished from the research that is performed at institutions of higher learning, which is
likely to have spillovers, and also from the stock of human capital individuals accumulate as a result of education, and
which may involve externalities.  As a result of the latter, education spending in one country may benefit other countries if
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Turning to infrastructure investment, national governments in Europe are already
heavily involved in this area.  Indeed, over the past two decades many governments have
concluded that some of the activities performed in the public sector could best be
privatized.  Thus, infrastructure investments in water distribution, telecommunications,
electricity generation, and rail and air transportation are increasingly likely to be carried out
by private firms, not government enterprises.  In this context, European-wide government
projects should not roll back the clock toward more government intervention, with its now
widely recognized inefficiencies.  The case for a greater European role rests on the
existence of unexploited profitable opportunities, whose benefits extend beyond the
individual country undertaking the investment.  For instance, a highway might benefit
neighboring countries, even if the residents of the country concerned would use it little.  Or
an information network might have favorable effects that could only be fully captured at a
supranational level.  Under this reasoning, EU fiscal policy should be involved in truly
“European” projects, rather than competing with the projects that national governments
already did.  Identifying such projects with Europe-wide externalities is not straightforward,
however.   In the example of a highway, levying a toll on users would allow the national
government to capture the externality, and eliminate the need for a European initiative; that
is, it is a “pecuniary externality” that does not require coordination.  It may be that for
“information superhighways” the ability to appropriate benefits is much more limited,
especially at early developmental stages, making a pan-European investment attractive.
EU financing of research and development would seem desirable in principle
since the benefits of increased knowledge are unlikely to accrue purely at the national
level
10.  Already, the EU has a modest budget to finance research projects in a number of
areas, and in nuclear energy EU-wide funding of research centers  (CERN) has a long
history.  European externalities are more likely at the pure research level, rather than at
the stage of commercial exploitation.  For the latter, joint ventures are likely to be
arranged, or collaborative efforts involving national government subsidies (Airbus,
Eurofighter, etc.) which do not involve EU institutions.
                                                          
10  However, Acs et al. (1996) argue that in Canada the “network dynamics” relevant for innovation are local or regional,
rather than national, and Bottazzi and Peri (1999) find that spatial spillovers from one European region on another within
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Another reason for EU involvement in funding research and development is that
there are spillovers from national policies
11.  In particular, the “business-stealing” effect
also operates across national borders, so that national subsidies to a particular high-tech
sector may be self-defeating if all countries engage in it.  Instead, coordination of R&D
policies would allow for more efficient allocation of resources.  For the same reason that
strategic trade policy is not possible in a free trade area, and responsibility for trade policy
transferred to EU institutions, at least some role in research and development policy
properly resides with community institutions.  Indeed, state aids to industry in the EU have
been greatly reduced and are subject to EU Commission oversight.
How the public sector can best stimulate innovation and capture externalities is
not a simple question, however.  Lipsey and Carlaw (1996) survey 30 cases of government
involvement in producing and commercializing innovations.  They conclude that attempting
large technological leaps (Concorde, British gas-cooled nuclear reactors, Japanese 5th
generation computer project, among others) often are dangerous, because they are likely
to fail at great public expense, as are overriding private sector preferences on the course
of the innovation process, picking “national champions” and aiming at national prestige.
Government bureaucracies are not notably well suited for picking winners, though they
may serve to coordinate companies involved in innovation in the same area and facilitate
information spillovers.  One could question whether direct involvement of bureaucrats in
the selection and financing of projects is the appropriate model for the EU.  More
appealing is making available research grants or loans at attractive terms, the beneficiaries
of which are chosen by peer review rather than guided by the bureaucracy.  Applied
research would then be the province of the private sector.
The recommendations of Mansfield (1996) go in this direction.  Noting that
government, by subsidizing inappropriately, could do more harm than good even if social
returns in principle exceeded private ones, Mansfield formulates five guidelines.  First,
government programs should be small-scale probes using parallel approaches, and aim to
stimulate R&D in the private sector.  Second, political pressures to focus on beleaguered
industries should be resisted.  Third, the government should not get involved in the later
stages of development work. Fourth, when involved in stimulating research in civilian
technology the government should ensure proper coupling with the market; the private
                                                          
11  The nature of those spillovers depends on the type of policy (e.g. subsidies for fundamental research, or to the
production of high tech goods),  on whether innovation is best described by the varieties model or the quality ladder
model, and on whether research and development involves developing cutting-edge techniques or imitating and refining
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sector should have a role in project selection.  Fifth, given the fundamental uncertainty of
the R&D process, governments should recognize the advantages of pluralism and
decentralized decision making.
6.2 Stabilization
The argument has been made that EMU has increased the need for fiscal
stabilization, because it has eliminated the scope for national monetary policies to perform
this function. At the same time, the Stability and Growth Pact has placed strong constraints
on fiscal policies, in particular providing for sanctions of up to 0.5 percent of GDP should a
government’s deficit exceed 3 percent of GDP.  This will limit the possibility for fiscal
stabilization, should a country suffer an unfavorable shock when it is already running a
deficit close to the ceiling.  A common unemployment insurance system has been
advocated, given constraints on national stabilization policies, because it would create an
automatic stabilizer operating at the EU level
12.
However, evidence presented in Bayoumi and Masson (1996) suggests that
national governments in the EU were able in the past to perform as much fiscal
stabilization as is done in monetary unions such as the United States or Canada, so that
the need for more stabilization after the creation of EMU is not obvious
13.  Though the
efficiency of performing stabilization at the EU level might well be greater than for national
stabilization policies, because an EU-wide system would involve some redistribution in the
case of asymmetric shocks, and would thus not be subject to the same Ricardian offsets
(Bayoumi and Masson, 1998), the fundamental question is whether stabilization policy is
actually necessary or desirable.
While stabilization policy (e.g. operating through unemployment compensation)
may have welfare-improving effects if there are distortions that prevent instantaneously
achieving market-clearing wages and prices, the effects of stabilization policy on growth
are not clear cut.  Traditional growth theory would suggest that there should be no growth
rate effects of stabilization, since fluctuations would be independent of the exogenous
factors driving long-term growth.  However, newer theories provide a linkage between the
                                                          
12  See Mélitz and Vori (1992) and Pisani-Ferry, Italianer, and Lescure (1993).  Von Hagen and Hammond (1997) argue that
an effective system would not involve large net transfers, but would be very complex and hence difficult to implement,
while simpler schemes would not be very effective.
13  Fatás and Mihov (1999) present evidence for OECD countries that the greater the size of government spending relative
to GDP, the lower the volatility of output. EU countries have high government spending ratios when compared to other
industrial countries (or indeed to developing countries).  However, as we will see below lower volatility of output is
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two.   On the one hand, stabilization policy may reduce uncertainty by cushioning shocks,
and there is some evidence concerning the negative effects of uncertainty on investment
and growth (e.g. Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).   Of course, if fluctuations are predictable, it
is not correct to equate business cycles with uncertainty.  On the other hand, a new
literature related to the Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” suggests that
allowing economic downturns to weed out inefficient enterprises may actually be good for
growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, chapter 8).  Therefore, stabilization policy could be
harmful for growth if it reduced the necessary restructuring that should accompany
technical progress. Indeed, positive technology shocks may initially be associated with
economic downturns, as resources are reallocated to their most productive uses.  To the
extent that fluctuations are driven by “general purpose technology” shocks (see above),
government policy should not resist the restructuring process, though it may want to
cushion the worst effects on individuals, e.g. on those thrown out of work. Depending on
which view is taken about the effects of stabilization policy on growth, the limits embodied
in the Stability Pact may or may not be cause for concern.
A simple correlation across EU countries between the average growth rate of real
GDP and its standard deviation is significantly positive, and equal to about 0.5, not
negative as the above argument would suggest, but positive shocks to GDP could be
expected to increase both, so no causality is implied (Table 3).   A more interesting
exercise is to relate the strength of stabilization policy to the growth rate of output.  A
simple measure of stabilization policy is the slope coefficient in a regression of the deficit
ratio on the output gap
14.  A larger (positive) coefficient would indicate a greater use of
counter-cyclical stabilization policy.  A benchmark case would be if all revenues varied
proportionately with GDP, but all expenditures were fixed: if initially both revenues and
expenditures are equal to 50 percent of GDP (as is roughly the case for EU countries),
then the slope coefficient should be 0.5, since the deficit would increase in a downturn by
the decline in revenues, with no change in expenditure
15.  In order to correct for
simultaneity due to the stabilizing effects on output of the deficit, instrumental variables are
used, which tends to reduce the positive relationship among the variables.  Nevertheless,
                                                          
14  The output gap is calculated simply by dividing actual real GDP by smoothed GDP, the latter calculated using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with lambda=1000.
15  The empirical evidence suggests that while most industrial countries undertake some form of countercyclical fiscal policy,
in developing countries fiscal policy is typically procyclical.  Talvi and Végh (2000) explain this stylized fact by appeal to
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12 countries out of 15 have a positive slope (8 of which are significant at the 10 percent
level); details of the regressions are reported in the Appendix. The estimates suggest that
Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Finland engage in the most stabilization, with coefficients
well in excess of 0.5.  Two of these, Denmark and Sweden, have also experienced slow
growth in the last 3 or 4 decades.  At the opposite extreme are Greece, Ireland, and Italy,
with no stabilization, and relatively high growth
16.  Interestingly enough, if the slope
coefficients are correlated with average GDP growth, the correlation coefficient is strongly
negative, and equal to about -0.55, which is significant at the 5 percent level.  While not a
substitute for serious econometric testing, this suggests that stabilization may be harmful
to growth, consistent with a Schumpeterian model.  Thus from the perspective solely of
growth, limits on the ability to perform stabilization policy would not seem to be cause for
concern. Of course, the reason for adopting automatic stabilizers, for instance
unemployment insurance, is not necessarily related to growth, since such policies may be
motivated primarily by welfare objectives.  Moreover, stabilization policy may be desirable
to control booms (for instance to limit inflationary pressures), while this phase of
stabilization would not be subject to the objection that it was limiting creative destruction.
6.3 Redistribution
Conventional wisdom says that redistribution policy is bad for growth because of
negative incentive effects.  A new literature (Aghion et al., 1999; Aghion and Howitt, 1998,
chapter 9) suggests that redistribution may in fact be good, if there are capital market
distortions that prevent resources going to their most productive uses (it is assumed that
the marginal product of the poor is higher than that of the rich, because their existing level
of capital in productive activities is lower).   In these circumstances, redistribution favors
growth because it allows the poor to accumulate capital, for instance working capital to
start a business.  A slightly different argument has to do with ensuring minimum levels of
public goods and services that are thought to promote growth (Kollintzas et al., 1999).
Because of different levels of per capita income, regional or local governments may not be
able to provide those services at similar tax rates, and higher tax rates in poorer regions or
localities will provide incentives for the more mobile, and presumably better educated, to
leave, impeding income convergence.  Equalization of fiscal capacity is the explicit
justification for redistribution among provinces as carried out by the Canadian fiscal system
(see Courchene, 1993).
                                                          
16  Coefficients are negative but insignificant. Negative coefficients that are insignificantly different from zero may result from
the existence of a large debt stock over at least some of the period, which implies that much of the fiscal position is
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There is a large amount of redistribution within EMU countries, especially when
compared to the United States or the United Kingdom.  Table 4 presents data on social
protection spending for EU countries.  It can be seen that the set of countries where the
ratio to GDP is above 30 percent in 1996 includes the nordic countries and most of the
original members of the EEC, while many countries on the “periphery” including newer
non-nordic members have ratios well below 30 percent.  It is interesting to correlate growth
with social benefits, though clearly one needs a longer period than would be possible using
1996 data, and caution is needed in interpreting the results.  Different types of social
spending may have different effects (e.g. pensions vs. unemployment benefits) and the
methods of financing (e.g. social contributions vs. VAT) may also affect the estimated
relationship.  In order to avoid the effects of lower growth on increased social benefits,
initial values of the latter (as ratios to GDP) are correlated with subsequent GDP growth
17.
Social benefits data are only available on a comparable basis for all EU countries starting
in 1993, giving only a short period for evaluating growth, so various subsets of countries
are examined over time periods dictated by data availability.
The results suggest no support for the new view that redistribution is favorable to
growth.  Admittedly, the negative correlation declines as more countries (but a shorter
subsequent growth period) are included.  More detailed measures of redistribution are
possible, and they are likely to have different effects.  A larger sample, including some
non-EU countries, might allow greater confidence in the results.  But on the face of it, the
traditional view of a tradeoff between equity and growth, at least in Europe, is not
contradicted.
Though redistribution is pervasive within EU countries, across Europe (e.g.
between countries), there is little redistribution.  Extending the theoretical argument made
above that redistribution would favor growth  at this level is even harder to make
convincingly.  While individuals may well face capital market imperfections, which prevent
the poor from borrowing to finance productive investment, to make a case for
intergovernmental redistribution one must also show that governments are constrained in
their attempts to carry out redistribution or to make productive infrastructure investments.
EMU countries now face generally well developed access to international capital markets.
                                                          
17  There is still a potential problem of reversed causation if poorer countries can only afford lower levels of social protection,
but grow faster as they converge to per capita income levels of the rest of the EU.  This would suggest controlling also
for the initial level of income, but paucity of observations made this difficult.  Following Temple (1999), we have also not
included traditional regressors (e.g. investment/GDP ratios), because of their pervasive endogeneity, preferring to focus
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EMU, by creating a single capital market, has increased the access to financing by
governments (as evidenced by data on narrowing spreads) and corporations (creation of a
euro Commercial Paper and junk bond markets).  Davis (1998) argues that the
combination of the single currency and a move toward funded pensions will lead to
substantial financial deepening in Europe.  So national governments should be able to
perform redistribution among their populations or provide domestic infrastructure without
the need for a supranational institution.
There are two other arguments for redistribution across countries.  First, because
of different per capita income levels, tax capacity varies, meaning that to provide similar
social services, governments will need to have different tax rates, leading to migration.
Migration is inefficient if it serves only to arbitrage differences in net fiscal benefits,
because it involves resource costs (transportation, basic services, housing construction).
Some redistribution may therefore be optimal from this perspective (see Boadway, 1996).
Second, redistribution can have the purpose of facilitating solidarity among EU member
countries and fostering public support for greater integration.  If the latter is good for
growth (as would be suggested by the experience of countries such as Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain since joining the EU), the modest amount of redistribution involved in
Structural and Cohesion Funds may be justified from a growth perspective.
However, the case for enhanced EU redistribution does not seem particularly
compelling from these two perspectives.  The problem in the EU is not too much factor
mobility, but too little. The experience of regional redistribution suggests that it contributes
to factor immobility (in particular, by limiting the incentives for migration between regions)
and the latter is likely to be inimical to growth.   For instance, labor mobility contributes to
the spread of knowledge and enhances the knowledge externality, as well as allowing
factors to be employed in their most productive uses. Automatic transfers may reduce the
incentives for countries to make needed structural reforms (Persson and Tabellini, 1996).
The pitfalls of systematic regional redistribution could be illustrated in the Canadian and
Italian contexts.  For instance, Courchene (1993) talks of  “welfare dependency” of the
poorer Canadian provinces (i.e. the Maritimes), which have persistently benefited from
federal equalization payments.  As for the solidarity argument, the reduction in per capita
income differences that have occurred within the EU suggest that increased inter-country
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I would argue that the strongest case for a European social security policy is not
to achieve redistribution across national borders in order to allow the poor access to
productive opportunities or for poorer governments to provide necessary infrastructure, but
rather to standardize benefits to facilitate labor mobility.  Social security systems differ
considerably across EU countries.  Table 5 illustrates the extent of variation in public
pension spending, replacement ratios of  public pension programs, and the extent of
private pension funds.  Not surprisingly, the latter two are negatively correlated.  Lack of
portability and standardization of pension benefits can be a barrier to mobility across
borders in Europe (Dantec and Pelgrin, 1998).
There is already an emerging consensus that the generosity of PAYG pension
plans needs to be cut back, though whether they would be partially replaced by fully
funded plans is still contentious (Boldrin et al., 1999).  The latter would facilitate labor
mobility, if provisions of the various plans are standardized and their portability is ensured
by legislation.  Otherwise, they will further impede mobility.  The transition away from
PAYG plans toward funding will in any case be difficult to achieve fully, especially in the
context of a demographic transition that reduces the number of contributors to
beneficiaries (Miles and Timmermann, 1999).  The mostly likely solution is not the
elimination of public PAYG plans, but rather the coexistence of reduced benefits provided
by PAYG plans with an expansion of funded plans.  If this process of pension reform
proceeds, social security programs could be redefined so that some benefits were portable
across countries, helping to encourage mobility, rather than contributing to immobility.  It
will be important to make the basic pension levels similar, and to enforce portability of
funded pensions.  If this is done, qualifying years of service for pensions could be earned
in any EU country, and the unemployed could be allowed to draw benefits while moving to
another country or region where they judged the prospects of finding a job were better.
How could pension reform best be achieved in the EU, so as to facilitate labor
mobility ?  Some have argued that there is no case for involvement of EU institutions, that
the issue can be handled by intergovernmental agreements (Dantec and Pelgrin, 1998).
However, effectively removing barriers to mobility presupposes a high degree of
harmonization of social security policies, and its implementation would cause problems of
administration if not done centrally.  In practice, the required degree of coordination may
not be possible if left to national authorities, and the task would be simplified by a common,
EU-wide social security system that was run, or at least guided, by EU institutions, possibly
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competencies between the EU and national governments (as in a federal system), which
he views as necessary in the area of social security in order to make progress in
coordinating and harmonizing policies.  He argues that the EU should have primary
responsibility for “income replacement” schemes (unemployment benefits, pensions,
income support), and the national governments for “cost compensating” schemes (medical
care, child allowances).  Such a radical proposal would be difficult to implement in one
step, Pieters and Vansteenkiste (1993) had earlier proposed that a new, EU-run, social
insurance scheme be introduced just for migrants between EU countries. Such a scheme
would provide an element of competition for national social security programs that would
tend to harmonize them, but not produce excessive reduction of benefits.
If the current public pension plans are replaced by funded defined contribution
schemes, then the latter would in principle be more portable, even if they involved different
national contribution rates, if they satisfied certain basic requirements. As argued above,
however, the trend that is now developing in Europe toward funded pensions is not likely to
eliminate PAYG schemes completely.  There will remain a need for providing a minimum
level of benefits, not linked to an individual’s contributions.  This suggests a “two pillars”
approach, in which the first pillar would involve basic benefits provided by the EU and
financed by either EU budgetary revenues or a special EU contribution. Such a scheme
would avoid the problem of tax competition producing inadequate revenues to finance
minimum social benefits, while allowing different national preferences on the extent of
additional benefits to be implemented in the “second pillar,” which would be provided by
funded, national schemes, subject to some standardization imposed by EU regulations.
This standardization would aim to make pensions provided by the second pillar portable,
so they would not distort employment decisions or be a barrier to labor mobility.
Progress on social security reform leading to greater harmonization across the EU
presupposes some consensus on the desirable extent of social security and the way in
which current PAYG schemes are to be made solvent.  However, there is likely to be
considerably greater agreement on the need for, and the level of, minimum social benefits
than on other aspects of reform, so that a scheme that allows diversity in those other
aspects is more likely to be implemented.  Also, its design should attempt to enhance
mobility by standardizing benefits without  producing large net flows between countries.
For funded pensions, this would not be a problem, but for the basic pension, if benefit
levels were high, differences in income levels would lead to net flows.   The accession to
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while differences in demographic profiles (as is the case for instance, when Spain is
compared to her northern neighbors) would also produce substantially different revenues
and disbursements if benefit levels were high.  Thus it is likely that minimum social benefits
would be relatively low, at least initially.
A more serious obstacle to reform is reflected in fundamental differences of view
on the benefits and costs of competition.  In some countries competition among social
security systems is considered a good thing precisely because it will shrink them, while the
view in others is that the level of benefits (“les acquis sociaux”) needs to be defended at all
costs.  Even within some countries (such as Belgium), the extent of regional redistribution
within the national social security system is a source of contention, and there are calls for
regionalization of social security.  Thus, the extension of EU fiscal powers into this area is
unlikely to occur without considerable conflict and soul-searching, even though the logic of
integration may push in that direction in the longer term.  Pressures for harmonization of
social security may only occur after there has been sufficient mobility to make problems
evident.  However, if non-portability of benefits constitutes a serious barrier to mobility,
these pressures may never develop, and Europe may get stuck in a low mobility, low
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Coordination of fiscal policies will be a major issue within the euro zone and the
EU for the foreseeable future.  In the absence of coordination, there will be pressures from
tax competition to limit the level of services provided by governments.  Coordination can
result from inter-governmental agreements to harmonize taxes and benefits, from a
European wide fiscal policy, or from surveillance and peer pressure on fiscal policies.
Though harmonization has occurred in a number of specific areas, resistance to
harmonizing taxes on non-labor income or spending policies is likely to continue.  Stable
systems that can dependably rule out the worst outcomes from uncoordinated policies are
likely to involve the development of EU-wide fiscal policies.  However, agreement on what
such a fiscal policy should involve seems distant at this point in time.
Endogenous growth theory points to a few areas where externalities might
suggest that EU-wide policies would be desirable, in particular, in order to stimulate
knowledge-creating activities and factor mobility. However, it does not imply a clear need
to expand EU-wide stabilization or redistribution, neither of which seems to stimulate
growth.   Moreover, by helping to create a single market for goods and factors, the euro
will tend to increase flexibility of goods and factor prices and eliminate credit market
distortions, reducing the need for government intervention to counter shocks.  Evidence
reported in Bayoumi and Masson (1995) that EU governments performed as much (or as
little) stabilization as US states or Canadian provinces provides some support for this
position.  Over time, there may be some gradual increase in the taxing power at the EU
level, accompanied by reductions in fiscal responsibilities of national governments.  The
above suggests that the EU should concentrate on encouraging economies of scale not
exploited by single countries (e.g. transportation or information networks), on stimulating
knowledge-based activities that may have European-wide externalities (R&D), and on
reducing obstacles to labor mobility by harmonizing some elements of social security.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 27
Table 1 - Selected Industrial Countries: General Government Revenues and Expenditures
(percent of GDP)
Revenues Expenditures
1998 1999 1998 1999
Country
European Union
Austria 51.7 51.7 54.2 54.0
Belgium 46.4 46.3 47.5 47.1
Denmark 56.8 58.1 55.9 55.3
Finland 51.1 51.2 49.8 48.2
France 51.5 51.9 54.2 53.9
Germany 46.6 47.3 48.3 48.5
Greece 47.1 47.4 49.6 49.1
Ireland 34.1 34.1 32.0 30.9
Italy 46.5 46.8 49.2 48.8
Luxembourg 44.9 46.2 42.3 43.9
Netherlands 44.3 45.5 45.1 45.3
Portugal 43.4 45.0 45.5 46.7
Spain 40.2 39.8 41.9 41.1
Sweden 60.5 60.2 58.4 58.5
United Kingdom 38.7 39.0 38.5 38.6
average 46.9 47.4 47.5 47.3
Other European Countries
Iceland 37.0 35.4 36.6 34.6
Malta 33.3 34.8 43.7 43.4
Norway 50.4 50.2 46.5 45.6
Switzerland 38.2 37.2 39.3 39.1
Turkey 24.0 24.8 34.8 41.2
Other Industrial Countries
Australia 33.1 33.2 32.9 32.9
Canada 48.3 47.6 47.4 45.4
Japan 31.9 30.6 36.2 37.8
New Zealand 37.5 36.1 35.1 35.1
United States 29.9 30.1 30.0 29.6
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Table 2 - EU Budget for 1999
Billions of euro Percent of EU GDP
Total commitment appropriations 96.93 1.25
Of which: Percent of total
Agriculture 40.94 42.2
Structural operations 39.26 40.5
External action 6.22 6.4
Administrative expenditure 4.50 4.6
Research and technology 3.45 3.6
Other 2.56 2.6
Percent of EU GDP
Total revenues (equals total payment
appropriations)
85.56 1.10
Of which: Percent of total
GNP-based contributions 39.26 45.9
VAT 30.37 35.5
Customs duties 11.89 13.9
Other 4.04 4.7
Source: European Commission (1999).NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 29
Table 3 - Real GDP Growth and Stabilization Policy, 1960-98
1
Average rate of growth g
Standard deviation s
Slope coefficient b:
DEF/PY=a+b(Y/YBAR)
Austria
2 3.15% 2.11% 0.172
Belgium 3.27% 2.07% 0.501*
Denmark 2.86% 2.30% 1.119*
Finland 3.34% 3.05% 0.566*
France 3.31% 2.06% 0.197
Germany 2.87% 2.18% 0.038
Greece 4.09% 3.57% -0.249
Ireland 4.70% 2.52% -0.203
Italy 3.50% 2.87% -0.597
Luxembourg 3.12% 2.69% 0.185*
Netherlands 3.80% 5.10% 0.069
Portugal
3 3.73% 3.36% 0.606*
Spain 4.16% 3.00% 0.307*
Sweden 2.50% 2.17% 1.150*
U.K 2.43% 2.05% 0.471*
correlation between
g and s = 0.506
Correlation between
g and b=-0.554
1  Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook database. Time period is shorter when full
data sample did not exist.  Regression of the general government deficit as a ratio to nominal GDP (DEF/PY) on the
output gap (Y/YBAR) used instrumental variables, with two lags of the lagged output gap and of real GDP growth as
instruments.  The output gap is actual GDP divided by  GDP smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, with value of
lambda=1000.  For Germany, pre-unification data were scaled up to make them comparable.
2 Growth rate and standard deviation calculated for 1964-98.
3 Growth rate and standard deviation calculated for 1969-98.
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Table 4 - Social Benefit Spending (s) and Subsequent Growth (g) in the EU
(as percent of GDP and as percent, respectively)
Total social
benefits,
1985
GDP growth
rate,1986-98
Total social
benefits,
1990
GDP growth
rate,1991-98
Total social
benefits,
1993
GDP growth
rate,1994-98
Austria 26.4 2.54% 25.9 2.14% 28.1 2.36%
Belgium 26.9 2.50% 25.4 2.23% 27.3 1.54%
Denmark 27 2.17% 29.4 2.70% 32.6 3.62%
Finland 2.28% 24.6 1.65% 34.5 4.58%
France 27.3 2.14% 26.4 1.47% 29.5 2.23%
Germany 25.6 2.42% 24.4 1.83% 28 1.69%
Greece 1.88% 21.3 1.98% 21 2.57%
Ireland 22.9 5.92% 18.2 6.30% 19.9 8.53%
Italy 21.4 1.90% 22.9 1.26% 24.7 1.76%
Luxembourg 23.2 3.44% 22.6 2.68% 24.3 3.15%
Netherlands 30.6 2.81% 31 2.61% 32 3.20%
Portugal 3.57% 13.6 2.29% 18.2 3.09%
Spain 19 3.00% 19.9 2.06% 23.8 2.94%
Sweden 1.49% 0.98% 38 2.64%
U.K 2.54% 22.1 2.05% 27.7 3.10%
correlation
between s and g
-0.271 -0.260 -0.210
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Table 5 - Pension Systems in the EU
Country Public pension
benefits as percent
of GDP
Gross
replacement
ratio of public
pensions
1
Private pension funds
(percent of GDP)
Austria 14 70 1.1
Belgium 12 45 4.3
Denmark 13 37 22.2
Finland 10 59 14.4
France 13 51 4.5
Germany 12 43 5.8
Greece n.a. 48 2.8
Ireland 5 21 43.3
Italy 15 75 2.5
Luxembourg 11 76 0.2
Netherlands 11 31 88.9
Portugal 8 74 10.7
Spain 10 63 4.1
Sweden 13 50 32.7
United Kingdom 10 14 75.6
     EU Average 12 50.5 20.9
Canada n.a. 45.4
Japan n.a. 21.8
United States 45 62.4
Source: Boldrin et al. (1999), Davis (1998), Tables 2 and 7.
1 As percent, based on $50,000 salary in 1997.32 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
Appendix Table - Instrumental Variables Regressions
1
DEF/PY=a+b(Y/YBAR)
(absolute t-ratios in parentheses)
Country Intercept Slope R-squared Durbin-Watson Time period
Austria -0.210
(1.31)
0.172
(1.08)
0.085 0.351 67-98
Belgium -0.556
(2.10)
0.501
(1.89)
0.137 0.162 63-98
Denmark -1.122
(4.03)
1.119
(4.02)
0.294 0.610 63-98
Finland -0.590
(3.67)
0.566
(3.52)
0.306 0.313 63-98
France -0.216
(1.28)
0.197
(1.17)
0.102 0.455 63-98
Germany -0.051
(0.56)
0.038
(0.42)
0.029 0.572 63-98
Greece 0.183
(0.54)
-0.249
(0.73)
-0.037 0.407 63-98
Ireland 0.136
(0.615)
-0.203
(0.92)
-0.029 0.144 63-98
Italy 0.512
(1.18)
-0.597
(1.37)
-0.042 0.506 63-98
Luxembourg -0.150
(1.18)
0.185
(1.45)
0.110 0.686 65-98
Netherlands -0.097
(1.25)
0.069
(0.88)
0.079 0.440 63-98
Portugal -0.679
(3.46)
0.606
(3.10)
0.347 0.792 72-98
Spain -0.338
(3.69)
0.307
(3.35)
0.309 0.553 63-98
Sweden -1.185
(3.73)
1.150
(3.62)
0.383 0.757 63-98
United Kingdom -0.495
(2.57)
0.471
(2.45)
0.126 0.430 63-98
1 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook database. Time period is shorter when full
data sample did not exist.  Regression of the general government deficit as a ratio to nominal GDP (DEF/PY) on the
output gap (Y/YBAR) used instrumental variables, with two lags of the lagged output gap and of real GDP growth as
instruments.  The output gap is actual GDP divided by  GDP smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, with value of
lambda=1000.  For Germany, pre-unification data were scaled up to make them comparable.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 33
References
Acs, Zoltan, John de la Mothe, and Gilles Paquet (1996), “Local Systems of Innovation: In
Search of an Enabling Strategy,” in P. Howitt, ed., The Implications of Knowledge-Based
Growth for Micro-Economic Policies, Industry Canada Research Series (Calgary:
University of Calgary Press), pp. 339-59.
Aghion, Philippe, Eve Caroli, and Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa (1999), “Inequality and
Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories,” Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 37 (December),  pp. 1615-60.
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1998), Endogenous Growth Theory (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press).
Aschauer, David   (1989), “Is Productive Expenditure Productive?” Journal of Monetary
Economics (March).
Barro, Robert (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,”  Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 106  (May), pp. 407-443.
Barro, Robert, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992), “Public Finance in Models of Economic
Growth,” Review of Economic Studies Vol. 59 (October), pp. 645-61.
Bayoumi, Tamim and Paul Masson (1995), “Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada:
Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe,” European Economic Review, Vol. 39, pp. 253-74.
__________ (1998), “Liability-creating versus Non-liability-creating Fiscal Stabilisation
Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU,”  The Economic Journal,
Vol. 108 (July), pp. 1026-45.
Benabou, Roland (1996), “Inequality and Growth,” in B.S. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg,
eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 11 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Boadway, Robin (1996), “Comment on John Whalley, Interprovincial Barriers to Trade and
Endogenous Growth Considerations,”  in P. Howitt, ed., The Implications of Knowledge-
Based Growth for Micro-Economic Policies, Industry Canada Research Series (Calgary:
University of Calgary Press), pp. 178-85.
Boldrin, Michele, Juan Dolado, Juan Jimeno, and Franco Penacchi (1999), “The Future of
Pensions in Europe,” Economic Policy 29 (October), pp. 289-320.
Bottazzi, Laura, and Giovanni Peri (1999), “Innovation, Demand and Knowledge
Spillovers: Theory and Evidence from European Regions,” CEPR Discussion Paper 2279
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Bryant, Ralph (1995),  International Coordination of National Stabilization Policies
(Washington, DC: Brookings).
Buchanan, James and Richard Musgrave (1999),  Public Finance and Public Choice: Two
Contrasting Visions of the State (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).34 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
Cohen, Daniel, and Charles Wyplosz (1989),  “The European Monetary Union: An
Agnostic Evaluation,” in R.C. Bryant, D.A. Currie, J.A. Frenkel, P.R. Masson, and R.
Portes, eds.,  Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World (Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund), pp. 311-37.
Courchene, Thomas (1993), “Reflections on Canadian Federalism: Are There Implications
for European Economic and Monetary Union?” European Economy, Reports and Studies
No. 5: The Economics of Community Public Finance, pp. 123-66.
Crafts, Nicholas (2000), “Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century,” IMF Working
Paper WP/00/44 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).
Dantec, Alexis, and Florian Pelgrin (1998), “Retraites de l’Europe,” Revue de l’OFCE, no.
67 (October),
pp. 207-28.
Davis, E. Philip (1998), “Pension Fund Reform and European Financial Markets,” Special
Paper No. 107, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.
De Long, Bradford, and Lawrence Summers (1991), “Equipment Investment and Economic
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106  (May), pp. 445-502.
Easterly, William, and Sergio Rebelo (1993),  “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An
Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 32 (December), pp. 417-58.
Eichengreen, Barry (1992), “Designing a Central Bank for Europe: A Cautionary Tale from
the Early Years of the Federal Reserve System,” in M. Canzoneri, V. Grilli, and P. Masson,
eds.,  Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 13-40.
European Commission (1999), General Budget of the European Union for the Financial
Year 1999 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
Eurostat (1999), Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts: European Union, Iceland and
Norway (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
Fatás, Antonio and Ilian Mihov (1999), “Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers:
International and Intranational Evidence,” CEPR Discussion Paper 2259 (London: Centre
for Economic Policy Research).
Frankel, M.  (1962), “The Production Function in Allocation and Growth: A Synthesis,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 52, pp. 995-1022.
Goodhart, Charles (1996), “European Monetary Integration,” European Economic Review,
Vol. 40 (April), pp. 1083-90.
Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman (1991),  Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Harris, Richard (1996), “Evidence and Debate on Economic Integration and Economic
Growth,” in P. Howitt, ed.,  The Implications of Knowledge-Based Growth for Micro-
Economic Policies, Industry Canada Research Series (Calgary: University of Calgary
Press), pp. 119-62.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 35
Helpman, Elhanan, and M. Trajtenberg (1994), “A Time to Sow and a Time to Reap:
Growth Based on General Purpose Technologies,” CEPR Discussion Paper 1080
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Kollintzas, Tryphon, Apostolis Phillippopoulos, and Vanghelis Vassilatos (1999),
“Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: A Review,” CEPR Discussion
Paper 2212 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Lipsey, Richard, and Ken Carlaw (1996), “A Structuralist View of Innovation Policy,” in P.
Howitt, ed., The Implications of Knowledge-Based Growth for Micro-Economic Policies,
Industry Canada Research Series (Calgary: University of Calgary Press), pp. 255-333.
Lucas, Robert E. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”  Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 22(1), pp. 3-42.
_____ (1993), “Making a Miracle,” Econometrica, Vol. 61, pp. 251-72.
Mansfield, Edwin (1996), “Microeconomic Policy and Technological Change,” in J.C.
Fuhrer and J.S. Little, eds., Technology and Growth, Conference Series No. 40 (Boston:
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), pp. 183-200.
Melitz, Jacques, and Silvia Vori (1992), “National Insurance against Unevenly Distributed
Shocks,” CEPR Discussion Paper 697 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Mendoza, Enrique, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Patrick Asea (1997), “On the
Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long-Run Growth: Harberger’s Superneutrality
Conjecture,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 99-126.
Miles, David, and Allan Timmermann (1999), “Risk Sharing and Transition Costs in the
Reform of Pension Systems in Europe,” Economic Policy 29 (October), pp. 253-86.
Oates, Warren (1972), Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich).
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1996), “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing
and Redistribution,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, pp. 979-1009.
Pieters, D., and S. Vansteenkiste (1993), The Thirteenth State: Towards a Social Security
Scheme for Intra-Community Migrants (Leuven: Maklu).
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, Alexander Italianer, and R. Lescure (1993), “Stabilization Properties of
Budgetary Systems,” European Economy: The Economics of Community Public Finance,
Reports and Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 511-38.
Romer, Paul M. (1986), “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 94(5), pp. 1002-37.
Solow, Robert (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”  Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 70 (1), pp. 65-94.
Talvi, Ernesto and Carlos Végh (2000), “Tax Base Variability and Procyclical Fiscal Policy,”
NBER Working Paper 7499 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Tanzi, Vito (2000), “Globalization and the Future of Social Protection,” IMF Working Paper
WP/00/12 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).36 NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000
Tanzi, Vito, and Howell Zee (1997), “Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth,” IMF  Staff
Papers, Vol 44 (June), pp. 179-209.
Temple, Jonathan (1999), “Why Do Growth Rates Differ?” Journal of Economic Literature,
Vol. 37 (March), pp. 112-56.
Tiebout, Charles (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,”  Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 64, pp. 416-24.
Vansteenkiste, Steven (1998), “Social Security in the European Community: Towards a
Federal Style Division of Competencies?” in D. Pieters, ed., Social Protection of the Next
Generation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), pp. 251-76.
Von Hagen, Jürgen, and George Hammond (1997), “Insurance Against Asymetric Shocks
in a European Monetary Union,” in J.-O. Hairault, P.-Y. Hénin, and F. Portier, eds.,
Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Stability: Should We Rebuild Built-in Stabilisers?
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 171-88.
Walsh, Cliff (1993), “Fiscal Federalism: An Overview of Issues and a Discussion of Their
Relevance to the European Community,” European Economy, Reports and Studies No. 5:
The Economics of Community Public Finance, pp. 25-62.NBB WORKING PAPER No.7 - MAY 2000 37
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES
1. "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules" by M. Dombrecht and
R. Wouters, Research Series, March 2000
2. "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation" by L. Aucremanne,
Research Series, March 2000
3. "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante" by
A. Nyssens, P. Butzen, P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000.
4. "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium" by P. Jeanfils,  Research Series,
March 2000.
5. "Growth in an open economy: some recent developments" by S. Turnovsky, Research
Series, May 2000
6. "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: an OECD perspective" by I. Visco,
Research Series, May 2000
7. "Fiscal policy and growth in  the context of European integration" by P. Masson,
Research Series, May 2000
8. "The role of the labour market" by C. Wyplosz, Research Series, May 2000
9. "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth" by R. MacDonald,  Research
Series, May 2000
10. "Economic growth and monetary union" by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000